



# **Information in Balance Sheets about Future Stock Returns: Evidence from Net Operating Assets**

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# Balance Sheets & Stock Returns

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- *Balance sheet ratios* (Ou and Penman 1989, Holthausen and Larcker 1992, Lev and Thiagarajan 1993, Abarbanell and Bushee 1997 and Piotroski 2000).
  
- *Accrual and accrual components* (Sloan 1996, Fairfield et al. 2003a, Richardson et al. 2005, Chan et al. 2006, Cooper et al. 2008, Chan et al. 2008).



# Net Operating Assets (NOA)

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- The level of **net operating assets (NOA)** has recently gained attention as an important predictor related to earnings quality and equity valuation.
- *Penman (2004)* : NOA represents the cumulation over time of the difference between operating income and free cash flows; a cumulative measure of accruals (TACC) :

$$NOA_T = \sum_0^T \text{Operating Income}_t - \sum_0^T \text{Free Cash Flows}_t = \sum_0^T \text{Total Accruals}_t$$



# Sustainability Effect

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- *Hirshleifer et al. (2004)*: NOA is a strong negative predictor of future stock returns.
- High NOA indicates low sustainability of current profitability.
- Investors with limited attention, do not comprehend this low sustainability and tend to overvalue firms with high NOA relative to those with low NOA.
- ❖ Firms with high (low) NOA experience negative (positive) future abnormal stock returns.



# Sustainability Effect

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- Opportunistic earnings management.
- Investors fail to use of available accounting information.
- *Hirshleifer et al. (2004)* : “Our interpretation of the NOA anomaly accommodates but does not require, earnings management”



# Sustainability Effect

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- *Hirshleifer et al. (2004)* : NOA captures information over and above accruals about investor's overoptimism of the sustainability of current earnings performance.
- NOA picks up all cumulative differences between accounting and cash profitability.
- Accruals is a fragmentary indicator of these differences.



# Motivation

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- Previous research has not focused on the whether different forms of net operating assets are related with future stock returns. Distinctions could be based on
  - Business activities that NOA capture.
  - Benefits and obligations that NOA represent.



# Motivation

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- Second, the interpretation of the NOA anomaly is still a controversial issue.
- **Rational Interpretation**: High NOA firms are less risky than low NOA firms, and thus earn lower risk premia.
  - *Callen and Segal (2004)*: NOA can be used to derive a valuation models with time-varying discount rates.
  - *Hirshleifer et al. (2006)*: Missed risk factors could eliminate mispricing.
  - *Khan (2008)*: Firms with low working capital accruals exhibit distress risk characteristics.





# Motivation

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- The NOA anomaly can be also explained by a **behavioral interpretation**.
- *Opportunistic earnings management*: premature booking of sales, inflated inventory, capitalization of operating expenses, subjective write down decisions.
- *Slowdown in firm's business conditions*: difficulties in generating sales, overproduction, less efficient use of existing capital and pressures to extend credit terms.
- *Agency related overinvestment*: wasteful spending that serves manager's interests.



# Motivation

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- In all cases, high NOA provides a warning signal about the sustainability of current earnings performance.
  
- As such, investor's limited attention on the low sustainability could be an explanation for negative (positive) future abnormal stock returns of high (low) NOA firms.



# Motivation

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- High NOA are more likely to have high past growth in sales.
- *Extrapolation*: Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that investors extrapolate past performance too far into the future.
- As such, investor's errors in expectations about future growth could also be an explanation for negative (positive) future abnormal stock returns of high (low) NOA firms.



# Research Design

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- First, we investigate the relation of NOA & NOA components with future stock returns, after controlling for TACC :

$$NOA_T = NWCA_T + NNCOA_T = \sum_0^T \text{Operating Accruals}_t + \sum_0^T \text{Investing Accruals}_t$$

$$NWCA_T = WCA_T - WCL_T = \sum_0^T \text{Operating Asset Accruals}_t - \sum_0^T \text{Operating Liability Accruals}_t$$

$$NNCOA_T = NCOA_T - NCOL_T = \sum_0^T \text{Investing Asset Accruals}_t - \sum_0^T \text{Investing Liability Accruals}_t$$



# Research Design

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- Second, we investigate whether the NOA anomaly reflects rational risk premium or market inefficiency.
- Abnormal returns of hedge strategies on NOA and NOA components.
- ❖ Joint hypothesis dilemma of traditional market efficiency tests (Fama 1970, Ball 1978)
- Arbitrage opportunities of hedge strategies on NOA and NOA components.



# Research Design

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- Third, we distinguish between different behavioral hypotheses that can be put forward to interpret the NOA anomaly.
- Abnormal returns of hedge strategies on the expected and unexpected parts of NOA and NOA components.
- Abnormal returns of hedge strategy on NOA, after controlling for overinvestment.



# Sample Formation

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- The sample covers **all firm-year observations** with available financial statement data on Compustat annual database and stock return data on CRSP monthly files CRSP for the **period 1962-2003**.
- Financial companies are excluded because the discrimination between operating activities and financing activities is not clear for these firms.
- These criteria yield final sample sizes of 150.896 firm year observations with non-missing financial statement and stock return data.



# NOA definition

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- NWCA :

$$NWCA_t = WCA_t - WCL_t = (CA_t - C_t) - (CL_t - STD_t)$$

- NNCOA:

$$NNCOA_t = NCOA_t - NCOL_t = (TA_t - CA_t) - (TL_t - CL_t - LTD_t)$$

- NOA is defined as the difference non cash assets and non-debt liabilities :

$$NOA_t = (TA_t - C_t) - (TL_t - STD_t - LTD_t)$$





# Alternative NOA definition

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- NWCA:

$$NWCA_t = WCA_t - WCL_t = (ARE_t + INV_t + OCA_t) - (AP_t + OCL_t)$$

- NNCOA:

$$NNCOA_t = NCOA_t - NCOL_t = (NPPE_t + INT_t + OLA_t) - OLTL_t$$

- Thus, NOA is defined as the difference between operating assets and operating liabilities:

$$NOA_t = (ARE_t + INV_t + OCA_t + NPPE_t + INT_t + OLA_t) - (AP_t - OCL_t - OLTL_t)$$



# Measurement of Stock Returns

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- Raw stock returns (RET): compounded 12 month buy-hold returns inclusive of dividends and other distributions.
- Size-adjusted returns (SRET): deducting the value weighted average return for all firms in the same size-matched decile.
- Risk adjusted alphas are also considered from CAPM, Fama-French three factor (1995) model and Carhart four factor (1997) model.



# NOA and Stock Returns

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- Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of future raw stock returns on NOA and NOA components after controlling for TACC.
- That is, we examine directly whether NOA and NOA components can reflect additional information for future stock returns over and above than contained in TACC.
- Following Hirshleifer et al. (2004), we also use market capitalization and book to market ratio as asset pricing controls.

**Table 3: Regressions of *RET* on *NOA*, *NOA* Components and *TACC***

<b>Panel A: Regressions of <i>RET</i> on <i>NOA</i> and <i>TACC</i></b>				
<b>Intercept</b>	<i>Ln(MV)</i>	<i>Ln(BV/ MV)</i>	<i>NOA</i>	<i>TACC</i>
0.332 (4.355)	-0.019 (-2.3)	0.033 (2.943)	-0.089 (-5.089)	
0.278 (3.875)	-0.02 (-2.364)	0.026 (2.315)		-0.087 (-5.191)
0.331 (3.938)	-0.019 (-2.321)	0.034 (3.281)	-0.094 (-2.233)	0.003 (0.066)

<b>Panel B: Regressions of <i>RET</i> on <i>NOA</i> components (Initial Decomposition) and <i>TACC</i></b>					
<b>Intercept</b>	<i>Ln(MV)</i>	<i>Ln(BV/ MV)</i>	<i>NWCA</i>	<i>NNCOA</i>	<i>TACC</i>
0.29 (4.081)	-0.021 (-2.514)	0.031 (2.776)	-0.064 (-2.355)		
0.291 (3.86)	-0.018 (-2.233)	0.031 (2.785)		-0.054 (-2.712)	
0.332 (4.421)	-0.019 (-2.394)	0.033 (2.886)	-0.102 (-3.991)	-0.079 (-3.977)	
0.333 (4.011)	-0.019 (-2.434)	0.033 (3.218)	-0.108 (-2.603)	-0.085 (-1.9)	0.002 (0.049)

<b>Panel C: Regressions of <i>RET</i> on <i>NOA</i> components (Extended Decomposition) and <i>TACC</i></b>							
<b>Intercept</b>	<i>Ln(MV)</i>	<i>Ln(BV/ MV)</i>	<i>WCA</i>	<i>- WCL</i>	<i>NCOA</i>	<i>- NCOL</i>	<i>TACC</i>
0.297 (4.22)	-0.02 (-2.541)	0.029 (2.556)	-0.049 (-2.322)				
0.28 (3.997)	-0.02 (-2.396)	0.029 (2.523)		0.044 (1.439)			
0.288 (3.835)	-0.018 (-2.193)	0.032 (2.827)			-0.047 (-2.479)		
0.269 (3.756)	-0.02 (-2.451)	0.03 (2.74)				-0.047 (-0.916)	
0.336 (4.601)	-0.02 (-2.522)	0.032 (2.811)	-0.103 (-3.884)	-0.088 (-2.509)	-0.084 (-4.353)	-0.149 (-3.064)	
0.34 (4.193)	-0.02 (-2.531)	0.033 (3.179)	-0.112 (-2.495)	-0.088 (-2.338)	-0.096 (-2.111)	-0.158 (-2.815)	0.015 (0.333)



# Summary

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- *NOA and NOA components could be incrementally informative since they capture all cumulative past changes between accounting profitability and cash profitability, rather the most recent change.*



# Risk Premium or Market Inefficiency?

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- The relation of NOA and NOA components with future stock returns could be explained under a rational interpretation.
- To assess this possibility, we investigate abnormal returns of hedge strategies based on NOA components.
- ❖ Firms are ranked annually on each NOA component and then allocated into ten equally-sized portfolios (deciles).
- ❖ Time series averages of size-adjusted returns for each portfolio and hedge strategies on NOA components are computed.

**Table 4: *SRET* for Portfolios on *NOA* and *NOA* components**

<b>Panel A: <i>SRET</i> for Portfolios sorted by Components on Initial Decomposition of <i>NOA</i></b>			
<b>Deciles</b>	<i>NOA</i>	<i>NWCA</i>	<i>NNCOA</i>
<b>1st Decile</b>	0.081	0.022	0.061
<b>2nd Decile</b>	0.058	0.026	0.034
<b>3rd Decile</b>	0.035	0.029	0.032
<b>4th Decile</b>	0.033	0.024	0.037
<b>5th Decile</b>	0.029	0.017	0.015
<b>6th Decile</b>	0.021	0.023	0.016
<b>7th Decile</b>	0.022	0.023	0.02
<b>8th Decile</b>	-0.019	0.019	0.002
<b>9th Decile</b>	-0.026	0.016	-0.004
<b>10th Decile</b>	-0.075	-0.04	-0.056
<b>Hedge</b>	0.156	0.062	0.117
<b>t-statistic</b>	4.07	2.56	3.254

<b>Panel B: <i>SRET</i> for Portfolios sorted by Components on Extended Decomposition of <i>NOA</i></b>				
<b>Deciles</b>	<i>WCA</i>	<i>- WCL</i>	<i>NCOA</i>	<i>- NCOL</i>
<b>1st Decile</b>	0.022	-0.011	0.062	0.009
<b>2nd Decile</b>	0.024	0.011	0.035	0.009
<b>3rd Decile</b>	0.023	0.016	0.04	0.01
<b>4th Decile</b>	0.022	0.022	0.025	0.012
<b>5th Decile</b>	0.042	0.015	0.014	0.012
<b>6th Decile</b>	0.025	0.019	0.03	0.019
<b>7th Decile</b>	0.026	0.016	0.006	0.023
<b>8th Decile</b>	0.016	0.025	0.002	0.026
<b>9th Decile</b>	0.005	0.021	-0.009	0.008
<b>10th Decile</b>	-0.047	0.025	-0.045	0.03
<b>Hedge</b>	0.068	-0.036	0.107	-0.021
<b>t-statistic</b>	2.341	-1.625	2.77	-0.597

**Table 5: *SRET* for Portfolios on *NOA* and *NOA* components**

<b>Panel A: <i>SRET</i> for Portfolios sorted by Components on Initial Decomposition of <i>NOA</i></b>			
<b>Deciles</b>	<i>NOA</i>	<i>NWCA</i>	<i>NNCOA</i>
<b>1st Decile</b>	0.066	0.008	0.044
<b>2nd Decile</b>	0.059	0.026	0.049
<b>3rd Decile</b>	0.04	0.024	0.029
<b>4th Decile</b>	0.018	0.038	0.017
<b>5th Decile</b>	0.05	0.015	0.019
<b>6th Decile</b>	0.01	0.022	8E-04
<b>7th Decile</b>	0.012	0.018	0.023
<b>8th Decile</b>	-0.019	0.011	0.009
<b>9th Decile</b>	-0.027	0.017	0.001
<b>10th Decile</b>	-0.074	-0.046	-0.057
<b>Hedge</b>	0.14	0.055	0.101
<b>t-statistic</b>	5.878	2.281	3.665

<b>Panel B: <i>SRET</i> for Portfolios sorted by Components on Extended Decomposition of <i>NOA</i></b>				
<b>Deciles</b>	<i>WCA</i>	<i>- WCL</i>	<i>NCOA</i>	<i>- NCOL</i>
<b>1st Decile</b>	0.017	-0.012	0.053	0.012
<b>2nd Decile</b>	0.012	0.0235	0.034	0.005
<b>3rd Decile</b>	0.028	0.017	0.046	0.007
<b>4th Decile</b>	0.027	0.0049	0.01	0.014
<b>5th Decile</b>	0.036	0.0093	0.017	0.01
<b>6th Decile</b>	0.012	0.0225	0.018	-0.003
<b>7th Decile</b>	0.028	0.0176	0.009	-0.01
<b>8th Decile</b>	0.011	0.01	0.001	0.046
<b>9th Decile</b>	0.006	0.016	-0.002	0.04
<b>10th Decile</b>	-0.044	0.023	-0.052	0.011
<b>Hedge</b>	0.061	-0.035	0.105	0.001
<b>t-statistic</b>	2.158	-1.499	3.257	-0.007



**Table 5: *SRET* for Portfolios on *NOA* and *NOA* components**

<b>Panel C: <i>SRET</i> for Portfolios sorted by Components of <i>NWCA</i></b>					
<b>Deciles</b>	<i>ARE</i>	<i>INV</i>	<i>OCA</i>	<i>- AP</i>	<i>- OCL</i>
<b>1st Decile</b>	0.038	0.019	0.006	-0.024	0.024
<b>2nd Decile</b>	-0.008	0.004	0.022	0.014	0.01
<b>3rd Decile</b>	0.009	0.008	0.018	0.0004	0.015
<b>4th Decile</b>	0.024	0.03	0.035	-0.005	0.003
<b>5th Decile</b>	0.046	0.021	0.02	0.03	0.019
<b>6th Decile</b>	0.026	0.033	0.006	0.022	0.004
<b>7th Decile</b>	0.018	0.02	0.019	0.021	0.012
<b>8th Decile</b>	-0.003	0.022	0.002	0.026	0.005
<b>9th Decile</b>	-0.002	0.007	0.007	0.021	0.006
<b>10th Decile</b>	-0.015	-0.031	-0.004	0.026	0.035
<b>Hedge</b>	0.053	0.05	0.01	-0.05	-0.011
<b>t-statistic</b>	2.022	2.159	0.399	-2.495	-0.375

<b>Panel D: <i>SRET</i> for Portfolios sorted by Components of <i>NNCOA</i></b>				
<b>Deciles</b>	<i>NPPE</i>	<i>INT</i>	<i>OLA</i>	<i>- OLTL</i>
<b>1st Decile</b>	0.027	0.02	0.032	0.012
<b>2nd Decile</b>	0.036	0.042	0.019	0.005
<b>3rd Decile</b>	0.025	0.024	0.014	0.007
<b>4th Decile</b>	0.035	0.018	0.024	0.014
<b>5th Decile</b>	0.014	0.019	0.006	0.01
<b>6th Decile</b>	0.005	0.007	0.011	-0.003
<b>7th Decile</b>	0.024	0.02	0.01	-0.01
<b>8th Decile</b>	0.006	0.003	0.009	0.046
<b>9th Decile</b>	0.002	0.002	0.012	0.04
<b>10th Decile</b>	-0.042	-0.023	-0.005	0.011
<b>Hedge</b>	0.069	0.044	0.037	0.001
<b>t-statistic</b>	2.264	2.21	1.622	-0.007



# Risk Premium or Market Inefficiency?

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- In order to distinguish more properly between rational and irrational interpretations, it is useful to incorporate in our analysis other potential controls for risk.
  
- For this purpose, we conduct time series regressions of one-year ahead raw stock returns for hedge strategies based on NOA and NOA components on the CAPM model, the Fama-French (1995) three factor model and the Carhart (1997) four factor model



# Risk Premium or Market Inefficiency?

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- Fama (1970) was among the first to observe that tests of market efficiency are joint tests of mispricing and the model of market returns (or model of risk adjustment).
- In order to avoid the joint hypothesis dilemma, we apply the statistical arbitrage test designed by Hogan et al. (2004) to hedge strategies based on NOA and NOA components.



# Risk Premium or Market Inefficiency?

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- In particular, we test two implications of statistical arbitrage opportunities for each strategy:
  - whether its mean annual incremental profit is positive.
  - whether its time-averaged variance decreases over time.
- ❖ A strategy generates statistical arbitrage with  $1-\alpha$  percent confidence if :

$$H1 : \mu > 0 \quad \& \quad H2 : \lambda < 0$$

Table 6

Alphas from Factor Models and Statistical Arbitrage Opportunities for Hedge Strategies on *NOA* and *NOA* components

<b>Panel A: Alphas from Factor Models for Hedge Strategies on <i>NOA</i> and <i>NOA</i> components</b>							
<b>Model</b>	<i>NOA</i>	<i>NWCA</i>	<i>NNCOA</i>	<i>WCA</i>	<i>- WCL</i>	<i>NCOA</i>	<i>- NCOL</i>
<b>CAPM</b>	0.176 (4.176)	0.069 (1.996)	0.168 (4.001)	0.058 (1.867)	-0.019 (-0.804)	0.164 (0.046)	-0.073 (-1.684)
<b>Fama-French</b>	0.223 (4.103)	0.102 (3.444)	0.207 (3.686)	0.094 (2.289)	-0.030 (-0.948)	0.215 (3.517)	-0.155 (-2.786)
<b>Carhart</b>	0.196 (2.899)	0.093 (2.495)	0.170 (2.448)	0.069 (1.937)	-0.003 (0.090)	0.166 (2.203)	-0.127 (-1.837)

<b>Panel B: Statistical Arbitrage Opportunities for Hedge Strategies on <i>NOA</i> and <i>NOA</i> components</b>							
<b>Parameter</b>	<i>NOA</i>	<i>NWCA</i>	<i>NNCOA</i>	<i>WCA</i>	<i>- WCL</i>	<i>NCOA</i>	<i>- NCOL</i>
<b><math>\mu</math> (mean)</b>	0.039	0.012	0.033	0.013	-0.006	0.03	-0.01
<b><math>\lambda</math> (growth rate of st.dev.)</b>	-0.366	-0.447	-0.489	-0.583	-0.819	-0.366	-0.209
<b>H1 (<math>\mu &gt; 0</math>)</b>	0.000	0.015	0.000	0.034	0.097	0.000	0.092
<b>H2 (<math>\lambda &lt; 0</math>)</b>	0.007	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.055
<b>Sum (H1+H2)</b>	0.007	0.018	0.000	0.034	0.097	0.008	0.147
<b>Statistical Arbitrage</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No



# Summary

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- *The NOA anomaly is driven by the asset NOA components.*
- *It corroborates Hirshleifer et al. (2004) investor's misperception of firms with bloated balance sheets.*



# Expected and Unexpected NOA

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- The expected part of NOA is estimated by a modified version of the model of Chan et al. (2006) that is based on sales growth:

$$E_t(NO A_t) = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^5 NO A_{t-k}}{\sum_{k=1}^5 SA_{t-k}} SA_t$$

- The unexpected part of NOA is then given by:  $U_t(NO A_t) = NO A_t - E_t(NO A_t)$
- Abnormal returns of hedge strategies on the expected and unexpected parts of NOA and NOA components.

**Table 7: *SRET* for Portfolios on the Expected and Unexpected Parts of *NOA* and *NOA* Components.**

<b>Panel A: <i>SRET</i> for Portfolios Sorted by Expected Parts of <i>NOA</i> and <i>NOA</i> Components</b>							
<b>Deciles</b>	<i>NOA</i>	<i>NWCA</i>	<i>NNCOA</i>	<i>WCA</i>	<i>- WCL</i>	<i>NCOA</i>	<i>- NCOL</i>
<b>1st Decile</b>	0.028	0.046	0.019	0.019	0.039	0.017	0.024
<b>2nd Decile</b>	0.03	0.025	0.035	0.02	0.031	0.042	0.015
<b>3rd Decile</b>	0.03	0.031	0.034	0.032	0.042	0.034	0.024
<b>4th Decile</b>	0.021	0.029	0.03	0.035	0.036	0.034	0.025
<b>5th Decile</b>	0.037	0.023	0.029	0.047	0.045	0.027	0.025
<b>6th Decile</b>	0.038	0.045	0.028	0.044	0.04	0.033	0.036
<b>7th Decile</b>	0.026	0.022	0.032	0.019	0.025	0.031	0.04
<b>8th Decile</b>	0.018	0.038	0.027	0.028	0.014	0.015	0.031
<b>9th Decile</b>	0.033	0.013	0.028	0.035	0.02	0.03	0.034
<b>10th Decile</b>	0.044	0.033	0.043	0.025	0.012	0.042	0.05
<b>Hedge</b>	-0.016	0.013	-0.024	-0.006	0.027	-0.025	-0.026
<b>t-statistic</b>	-0.545	0.532	-0.914	-0.23	1.159	-0.763	-0.708

<b>Panel B: <i>SRET</i> for Portfolios Sorted by Unexpected Parts of <i>NOA</i> and <i>NOA</i> Components</b>							
<b>Deciles</b>	<i>NOA</i>	<i>NWCA</i>	<i>NNCOA</i>	<i>WCA</i>	<i>- WCL</i>	<i>NCOA</i>	<i>- NCOL</i>
<b>1st Decile</b>	0.063	0.052	0.056	0.05	0.043	0.061	0.009
<b>2nd Decile</b>	0.061	0.042	0.054	0.055	0.035	0.057	0.025
<b>3rd Decile</b>	0.055	0.05	0.054	0.052	0.011	0.042	0.027
<b>4th Decile</b>	0.034	0.032	0.036	0.033	0.026	0.044	0.023
<b>5th Decile</b>	0.045	0.032	0.036	0.033	0.024	0.04	0.058
<b>6th Decile</b>	0.035	0.026	0.03	0.038	0.027	0.022	0.039
<b>7th Decile</b>	0.029	0.02	0.031	0.029	0.024	0.031	0.029
<b>8th Decile</b>	0.004	0.026	0.018	0.016	0.032	0.023	0.044
<b>9th Decile</b>	0.004	0.021	0.017	0.013	0.027	0.009	0.019
<b>10th Decile</b>	-0.024	0.002	-0.025	-0.015	0.054	-0.024	0.032
<b>Hedge</b>	0.087	0.05	0.081	0.065	-0.011	0.085	-0.023
<b>t-statistic</b>	4.885	3.443	4.561	3.669	-0.779	4.542	-1.652





# Summary

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- *It does not seem to be the case, investor's extrapolation of past performance, is the culprit of the NOA anomaly.*
- *Opportunistic earnings management and/or slowdown in firm's business conditions could explain partially the NOA anomaly on the asset side.*



# Overinvestment

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- Chan et al. (2008) argue that past return on equity (ROE) can be used as an indicator of managerial discretion to use profits from past investment to increase shareholder wealth.
- Past ROE is measured as the ratio of annual net income averaged over the five years prior to portfolio formation to the fiscal year end book value of equity.
- Abnormal returns of hedge strategy on NOA, after controlling for past ROE.

**Table 8: *SRET* for Portfolios on *NOA* after controlling for *ROE***

<b>Groups</b>	<b>Pure Portfolios</b>	<b>Interacted Portfolios</b>		
		<i>ROE</i> (1)	<i>ROE</i> (2 – 4)	<i>ROE</i> (5)
<i>NOA</i> (1)	0.069 (2.823)	0.068 (1.278)	0.071 (3.159)	0.068 (2.975)
<i>NOA</i> (2 – 9)	0.023 (3.588)	0.028 (2.529)	0.023 (2.972)	0.019 (2.162)
<i>NOA</i> (10)	-0.053 (-4.16)	-0.092 (-4.825)	-0.053 (-3.674)	-0.011 (-0.645)
<b>Hedge</b>	0.122 (3.682)	0.16 (2.919)	0.124 (3.827)	0.079 (2.521)
<b>Joint Strategy : Long on <math>\{NOA(1), ROE(5)\}</math> &amp; Short on <math>\{NOA(10), ROE(1)\}</math></b>				0.16 (4.882)
<b>Difference: Joint Strategy and <i>NOA</i> strategy</b>				0.038 (1.178)



# Summary

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- *Overinvestment could also have a potentially important role in explaining investor's misperceptions of firms with bloated balance sheets.*



# Conclusions

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- Investors naively fail to anticipate that high levels of operating assets imply low sustainability of current profitability, leading to significant security mispricing.
- Opportunistic earnings management and/or slowdown in firm's business conditions could explain only partially explain the sustainability effect. Agency related overinvestment could also have a potential important role.
- Overall, our evidence suggests that the above hypotheses should be treated as supplementary in the interpretation the NOA anomaly.